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DREAMing the Ordinary: 
Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This paper intervenes in scholarly debates over citizenship by introducing the concept of 
‘ordinary’ to analyze citizenship’s complexities.  Ordinary is often taken to mean standard 
or routine, but it also invokes order and authority.  As such, conceptualising citizenship 
as ordinary trains our attention on the ways in which the spatiality of laws and social 
norms are entwined with daily life.  The idea of ordinariness, thus fuses legal structures, 
normative orders and the experiences of individuals, social groups and communities, 
making citizenship both a general category and a contingent resource for political life.  
We explore this argument using immigrants as an example, but the conceptualization of 
citizenship extends more broadly.   
 
 
Keywords:  Citizenship, law, social norms, daily life, immigrants, ordinary
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I  Jesus’ Dream 
 
In August 2002, Jesus Apodaca found himself in the middle of a political nightmare that 
threatened to result in the deportation of his family from the United States.  Just two 
months before, he had been living an American dream.  In June, he graduated from high 
school in Aurora, Colorado, with academic honours and as valedictorian. He came from 
an immigrant family, struggling to make ends meet, and the family was proud of his 
accomplishments.  Jesus was offered admission to the University of Colorado and was 
given a scholarship.  Then, it all unravelled.   
In August, the University withdrew its offer of financial assistance and told Jesus he 
would have to pay out-of-state tuitioni, because he entered the country illegally with his 
family when he was 12 years old.  When the story was reported on the front page of The 
Denver Post, there was outrage.  While some people were upset that a child who had 
achieved so much would be punished because of the acts of his parents, others were 
incredulous that the schools had educated an “illegal alien.”   The University responded 
that the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act tied its 
hands.  Title V, Section 505 of the act explicitly prohibits “eligibility for preferential 
treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher education 
benefits”.  
And that was as it should be, according to Tom Tancredo, a staunch critic of 
American immigration policies and, at that time, a Colorado member of the US House of 
Representatives.  Tancredo announced that Jesus and his family should be deported, and 
he notified the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) to that effect.  Almost 
immediately, private relief bills were introduced by Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell and Representative Mark Udall.  Private relief bills stop immigration 
proceedings for named individuals, placing a hold on deportations.  Unless the bills are 
passed, however, the individuals remain in a sort of legal limbo, unable to obtain 
permanent residence, but given leave to remain in the country.  Neither bill was passed, 
or importantly, defeated.  While the bills are tabled, no action can be taken against the 
named individuals.    
 Jesus’ dream was like those of many other children:  he wanted to continue his 
studies at a university.  But federal legislation prohibited him from paying the lower fees 
that other residents of the state of Colorado paid when they went to publicly funded 
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universities, because that would give him “preferential treatment.” While Jesus’ dream 
quickly became a nightmare, his case was not unusual.  In recognition of the problem – 
which predates Jesus’ specific case – a bi-partisan bill had been introduced in the 2001 
Congress called the “Development, Relief and Education for Minors Act.”  The 
DREAM Act, as it was known, would have given states the option to allow people like 
Jesus to pay in-state fees for tuition.  The bill was never debated, and so died.  It was re-
introduced in subsequent Congresses, but never passed.  In 2006, it was included as part 
of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, but was defeated.  It was reintroduced 
in 2007 and failed to get past a procedural hurdle; it was then included as an amendment 
to the Defense Authorization Act, but was ruled as non-germane to the act.  In 2010, an 
amendment was again attached to the Defense Authorization Act; the bill, however, 
included a number of amendments unacceptable to social conservatives, and the bill was 
defeated.  Activists in several states have proposed their own DREAM acts, but all have 
foundered.  Some universities have allowed undocumented students to pay in-state fees, 
but they recognise this violates federal legislation and their actions could not be 
supported if challenged.  Other universities have tried to establish privately funded 
scholarships for undocumented students, but with limited success.   
Something that seems so ordinary for thousands of American high school 
graduates each year – going to a publicly funded university in the state of their residence 
– is in fact extra-ordinary for thousands more who cannot attend. For students with 
good grades, whose parents have worked hard and have contributed to their local 
community, and who have lived in the US all or most of their life, the inability to pay 
resident fees seems both an insurmountable and an unfair hurdle.  It seems 
insurmountable because the fees are so high and financial assistance is not available.  It 
seems unfair because something that has become an expectation as a social right of 
citizenship is not available to those who are citizens in all but legal status.  
Citizenship, like the ability to attend university, is simultaneously ordinary and 
extra-ordinary.  This odd pairing emerges from the complexities of citizenship and the 
many influences on it.  Citizenship is a status in law that is framed through norms, 
constitutions, laws, and policies.  More than a legal attribute, however, it is also 
experienced as people move through their daily lives and as opportunities afforded by 
citizenship are opened and forestalled for particular individuals at particular moments.   
Significantly, these experiences of citizenship might seem to be unrelated to legal 
standing, and in some cases, the experience of citizenship might actually contradict legal 
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and normative ideals. There is also a spatiality to citizenship that makes it ordinary and 
extraordinary.  Citizenship is located in multiple sites, some of which are material places, 
some of which are metaphorical, and some of which are institutional.  And the people 
who hold citizenship enact their own spatial practices, confounding the territorial 
framing of citizenship codified in law. Despite its seeming incoherence, citizenship – as a 
legal standing, as a set of practices, and as characterised by a complex spatiality – is 
bound up with the processes and relationships that structure lives and politics in ways 
that cannot be ignored and that also provide the basis for political struggles.   
In this paper, we offer a way to understand the complexities of citizenship 
through the concept of ordinariness.  Ordinary is often taken to mean standard, routine, 
or average, but it also invokes a kind of order and authority, including legal authority. As 
we will argue, conceptualising citizenship as ordinary trains our attention on the ways in 
which laws and social norms are entwined with the routine practices of daily lives.  The 
idea of ordinariness, thus fuses legal structures, normative orders, and the experiences of 
individuals, social groups and communities, making citizenship both a general category 
and a contingent resource for political life.   
To build the case for the importance of understanding citizenship as ordinary, we 
first delineate the reasons that citizenship must be seen as a complex concept in which its 
spatiality is integral and that is bound up with the encounters of daily life.  We then 
develop this notion of the daily life of citizenship through the concept of ‘ordinariness.’ 
Throughout the paper, we illustrate our arguments using the example of immigrants.  
Immigrants are not the only people who must negotiate the oppositions and ambiguities 
inherent in citizenship. They provide a lens into such negotiations, however, because 
they have no claims or political standing except those granted by societies and by states 
(Ngai, 2004).  Yet as Honig (2001) demonstrates, the figure of the ‘foreigner’ casts a light 
on the quality of democracy and the possibility for an expansive citizenship.   
 
 
II The Complexities of Citizenship in Law and Daily Life 
 
 
This is the point in a paper when it is common to review different theoretical 
perspectives on citizenship and analyse their philosophical underpinnings.  In this 
strategy, the differences between liberal, republican, communitarian, radical, feminist, 
post-colonial (and on and on) theorizations would be explored.  We have chosen not to 
follow this strategy for several reasons, not least of which is the profusion of citizenships 
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that have been offered in recent years (see Isin and Nielsen, 2008).  With this 
proliferation, it would be difficult to provide a coherent discussion in a short articleii.  
More importantly for our purposes, however, many of these theoretical and 
philosophical discussions offer little purchase in understanding the interrelationships 
between legal status and practice that order the lives of citizens in the places to which 
they feel they belong and in which they live.  This ordering involves the status and rights 
of citizenship, but also conveys norms of social behaviour and the relationships that hold 
within various sites and communities.  This combination is what we call “ordinary 
citizenship.”    
To lay the foundation for this argument, we demonstrate the ways that 
citizenship is framed through the combination of several elements, including: laws and 
policies; normative frameworks related to justice and care; theories held by individuals 
about the political subject called ‘citizen’; and the spatiality of the relationships that 
construct citizenship as it is experienced and enacted.  While the state is present in each 
of these, we argue that it is in the interaction between state, community, and daily life that 
citizenship is animated and given meaning.  
 
Legal Frameworks for Citizenship 
 
Jesus’ story is one in which the importance of law and legal frameworks of citizenship are 
very important.  Indeed, many people who voiced an opinion argued that the law was the 
only relevant issue in his case.  But ‘the law’ was neither fixed nor coherent, as a variety 
of legal arguments have been advanced and many efforts to change it have been 
launched. Jesus’ experience highlights that the accretion of constitutions, laws, 
jurisprudence, and policies mean that legal frameworks within any country are likely to be 
complex, spatially differentiated, and internally inconsistent.  This complexity is amplified 
when the broad range of legal frameworks from multiple countries, from international 
law, and from localities are considerediii.   
 To make sense of this complexity, we begin with the analysis provided by legal 
theorist Linda Bosniak (2006).  She argues that there are two types of constitutional and 
legal practices that define and delimit citizenship; these include rules that define who is a 
member and rules about how members are to be treated.  Rules governing the 
delimitation of citizenship include how membership is distributed, the characteristics of 
those deemed worthy of citizenship, and the territorial units to which citizenship is 
attached (e.g., the nation).  Rules governing the ways members should be treated include 
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the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and the relationships between the state, 
polity, and individuals.   While Bosniak argues that the two sets of laws and practices 
delimiting citizenship are distinct in a legal sense, we argue that there is considerable 
overlap as people move through their daily lives.   This can be seen in several ways.  
First, if some rules define who is a member, and other rules define how members 
are to be treated, then there can be confusion as to whether rules about how citizens are 
to be treated apply to immigrants who are not officially members.  Bosniak argues that 
relatively few countries have explicit rules delimiting the rights of non-citizens, and even 
fewer are consistently applied.  For example, some legislation in the United States limits 
the ability of immigrants to receive social benefits, such as social security or access to 
primary and secondary education.  Yet those laws are at odds with employment 
legislation that requires immigrants with permanent residency to pay taxes for social 
security and with federal legislation that requires that children have access to the 
education system irrespective of their legal status.  Many pieces of legislation have been 
rescinded or struck down in the court system, yet some of the legislation remains part of 
the law, even if legally unenforceable. The result in this, and other cases, is a hodge-
podge of rules that are inconsistently applied and that therefore add to the complexity of 
citizenship that individuals and families negotiate.  The issue of families is very important 
here, as in countries where citizenship is granted to anyone born in the country, families 
may have a variety of legal standings; rules that apply to individuals, then, are experienced 
through families and households that are positioned with respect to the law and the 
communities in which they live in multiple ways (Bosniak, 2006). 
While it might be nice to have clear and consistent rules, the complexities as 
discussed above may nevertheless create opportunities for individuals that may work to 
some people’s advantage, and often in surprising ways. Jesus’ saga is an example.  The 
law that was interpreted as barring him from receiving a scholarship was a federal 
immigration law passed in 1996.  When it became clear that students such as Jesus would 
be deemed ineligible, the initial DREAM act was introduced specifically to rectify this 
problem, a problem that was estimated to affect about 50 students per year.  When the 
targeted bill failed, amendments were attached to other federal bills and state legislatures 
tried to amend their laws. And of course, court cases have abounded.  While the 
confused legal terrain in this single example is perhaps overwhelming, it does provide 
some opportunities precisely because of its complexity.  When last Jesus’ family appeared 
in the Denver papers, it was because a judge had issued an order that halted deportation 
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proceedings and ordered that family members receive the same benefits as if they were 
legal residents. This offers relief, even if the ruling appears to make the legal waters even 
murkier, since it goes beyond what is typically granted while private relief bills are tabled, 
but not acted upon.   
Second, in countries with complex legislative and judicial systems, it is not always 
clear which elements of the system should be used for immigrants.  Coleman (2007) has 
noted that many immigration proceedings in the US are governed by civil law, where 
there is a lower standard of proof, even though decisions are often enforced by police 
power and criminal penalties.  This comes about because some parts of the process are 
deemed to be a matter of defining who is a member and thereby whether they can stay; 
constitutional and legal protections in this part of the process are minimal, precisely 
because individuals are not recognised as citizens.  Yet other parts of the process draw 
on state powers to punish and enforce penalties as though the individuals were citizens. The 
effect is to create a legal space of lawlessness, where the laws and provisions to protect 
human rights no longer apply (see Agamben, 2005; Humphreys, 2006; Dikeç, 2009).   
Third, adding to the complexities of citizenship is the spatiality of law and legality, 
even when the discussion is focused on one country.  In Jesus’ case, the legal framework 
is shaped by the US Constitution, legislation and executive orders at the federal level, 
constitutions and laws in all 50 states, and laws and ordinances enacted in a host of 
counties and local governments.  This legislative apparatus is complicated further by a 
judicial structure that comes to a peak at the US Supreme Court, but that includes 
appellate and district courts under the federal judiciary, and then an equally complex set 
of court systems in each of the states.  Power, politics, and the potential to challenge 
issues are built into this structure.  The history of US politics and government is often 
narrated – and adjudicated – through the lens of states’ rights vis-à-vis federal powers, 
which is evident in both the legislative and judicial arenas.   This is why several states 
have initiated their own DREAM acts in seeming contravention of the federal 
immigration laws. While some challenges to federal legislation represent an attempt to 
liberalise immigration policies, there are other locally initiated efforts that attempt to 
keep out immigrants (Walker and Leitner, forthcoming).   
Finally, new security regimes in the US, Britain and other countries treat everyone 
as potentially liable to revocation of citizenship or to the diminution of the protections 
offered by citizenship.   For example, enhanced scrutiny aimed at immigrants is also 
applied to citizens, precisely because it is not possible a priori to know whether someone 
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is a citizen. Furthermore, a federal appeals court in San Francisco ruled that the US 
Justice Department can revoke citizenship of naturalised immigrants through closed 
administrative hearings outside the court system.  As a result, the distinction between 
rules that define membership and those that describe the treatment of members is 
blurring.  
 Law and legal systems are often described as being our best approximations of 
abstract ideals of justice in ‘the real world.’  It is not surprising that they are not perfect 
approximations; it would be more surprising if they were.  The contradictions hidden 
beneath the veneer of abstract justice and law, however, contribute to a lack of 
coherence in the ways citizenship is constructed and enacted in practice (Smith, 1997), or 
in our terms, in daily life.  This complexity reflects and embeds into law differing views 
of what citizenship should entail and how it is theorised in a normative sense.  These 
theories are constructed and reinterpreted by the broad public as they move through 
their daily lives.   
 
Normative Frameworks for Citizenship:  Justice and Care 
 
Debates over citizenship – in law, in academic writing, and in public discourse – often 
hinge on the ways in which competing normative values are activated, combined, and 
interpreted.  Abstract theories and political oratory are often judged on the basis of 
internal consistency and universal application, but in practice, laws and public debate 
typically draw upon multiple normative values.  It is the ways that values are assembled 
and mobilised in specific instances that contributes to the complexity of citizenship and, 
as before, presents certain political constraints and opportunities.  While this holds in 
general, we argue that it may be particularly important in the – often unarticulated – 
theories of citizenship that circulate in public debates.  
 One way into these debates is to think of them as prioritising either justice or care 
as the way to evaluate the characteristics of citizenship and its ability to foster self-
development and well-being.  Justice involves several, subsidiary principles, including fair 
and equal treatment of all individuals qua individuals, decision making and behaviour that 
is governed by the rule of law, and impartiality. But justice can be seen as more than a 
matter of law, but also as extending into the social relationships of daily life and as 
applying to everyone, regardless of legal status.   Academic proponents of this broad 
notion of justice as the normative foundation of democratic citizenship include Bauböck 
  10 
(1994), Benhabib (2004), Gould (2004),  Mouffe (2005), Walzer (1983), and Young 
(2000).   
Sitting alongside justice-based norms of citizenship are theories that emphasise an 
ethic of care. Care rests on a complex notion of equality that is based on the satisfaction 
of situated and particular needs that arise from the recognition of difference and the 
practices of accommodation (Jaggar, 2001). Proponents of an ethic of care are often 
sceptical of the idea that consistent and universal application of procedures will 
inevitably lead to optimum outcomes, because the particular needs of individuals will 
vary.  Instead, proponents of care argue that socio-political practices and relationships 
and individuals’ positioning within them need to be considered in building a democracy 
that can foster the well being of the citizenry; while the procedures and rights discussed 
in many justice-oriented theories are important, they play a complicated role in the 
relationships and practices that condition the outcome of democratic citizenship (Tronto, 
1993; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Held 2005). Philosophies of care often combine the 
importance of individual and human rights with recognition of the importance of mutual 
obligation and reciprocity.  
Participants in debates over citizenship may not articulate the normative values 
that underlie their positions or worry about the internal consistency of their arguments; 
this is particularly likely to be the case for theories that members of the public construct 
and articulate through debate and enact in daily life.   Yet these values and norms are 
important.  According to Olson and Sayer (2009, p 184), they “can be thought of as 
generalised, sedimented valuations of things, or dispositions towards them.  They are 
about something.  Our values guide particular evaluative judgements but can be reviewed 
and modified in the light of anomalous evidence arising from these particular 
evaluations.”  In this way, norms can be seen to underlie public debates or experiences of 
the world, but also to change in response to what is observed. Norms may be 
‘sedimented’ in law, but are not perfectly defined or completely settled by law.  Instead, 
they are activated, expressed, and tested in a variety of domains.   
We can identify at least two domains in which norms of justice and care in relation 
to citizenship are evident, are experienced, and are contested:  norms in relation to the 
boundaries of belonging – including how membership is distributed – and norms in 
relation to the rights and responsibilities of citizens.   These domains are frequently 
discussed together in terms of the substantive aspects of citizenship, but their normative 
bases are less frequently explored.   The discussion to this point has become increasingly 
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abstract, rather than grounded in daily life, so it might be useful to ask: “what would all 
this mean for Jesus?”  His case helps to both ground the abstract discussion, but also to 
crystallise what is at stake.  In so doing, it is possible to anticipate how norms would be 
combined in different domains to render certain perspectives on Jesus’ experiences 
interpretable (see Table 1).    
 
----- Table 1 about here ----- 
 
If justice is held to be the normative foundation of citizenship and the issue of 
boundary of membership was deemed to be most important in the case, it would be 
reasonable to argue that states set the rules of entry to a polity and thereby to citizenship 
rights.  Jesus’ parents did not follow the rules, so it is appropriate to deny rights and 
benefits to Jesus.   If, however, one were focused on justice as it overlaps with the rights 
and responsibilities of citizenship, one could reasonably argue that Jesus was not 
responsible for his parents’ actions and so should not be punished.  The parents might 
have crossed into the US without permission, but while in the US, they had lived as 
responsible members of the community, paid taxes, worked hard, and followed all the 
rules, except those governing entry.  Since the Apodacas had lived in the US for several 
years without transgressing other laws or expectations, punishing Jesus for an action he 
was compelled by his parents to commit would not be consistent with ideas of justice.   
A normative stance prioritising care in citizenship could lead to a similar 
conclusion, arguing that the boundary issues should be irrelevant at this point, in part 
because deportation would sever the relationships between Jesus, the family and the 
community that had been built and fostered over the years. The family was already 
within the borders of the US, so the relationships that tie them their community should 
surely take priority.  Furthermore, by all accounts, the family and Jesus were active, 
responsible members of the community. Responsibilities go two ways, an advocate of 
care might argue.  The community has responsibilities to those who have lived in and 
contributed to it as members, including the responsibility to support their nurture and 
development.  From an ethical stance emphasising care, it would not be appropriate to 
deport the family, and so family members should be treated as though they held the 
formal status of citizen.    
This is obviously a crude, simplistic assessment that relies on oppositions, but it 
provides a way of thinking about the ways in which different dimensions or aspects of 
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citizenship are assembled in daily life and may inform the ways in which differently 
positioned individuals and groups frame and subsequently animate their theories of 
citizenship.  The example also points to the contested and often uneasy relationships 
between individuals, groups, communities, and the state that together constitute the 
citizen-subject.  
 
The Citizen-Subject 
 
The framings of citizenship in law and in normative debates suggest different ideas about 
who is, who should be, who can be a citizen, and how they can be citizens.  If the 
distribution of membership is one of the primary activities undertaken by human 
communities, as Walzer (1983) argues, then questions about who can be a member are of 
critical importance and are important for all kinds of reasons.  They are important 
because membership in communities offers access to resources held by communities, but 
also because the denial of membership will have ethical and material implications that are 
important to the quality of democracy within and across communities.  Not surprisingly, 
then, questions about membership have been at the root of many struggles – in both the 
state and communities – and conflicts through history.  
 Struggles to extend membership are almost invariably group struggles (Phillips, 
2007; Shklar, 1990).  The history of suffrage, for instance, is one in which people have 
struggled on behalf of groups – not on behalf of specific individuals – to be included in 
the electorate.  In these struggles, abstract and idealised figures of individuals might be 
put forward, and these figures might look like and might be represented by real 
individuals.  “Lady Libertyiv” was an important figure in the women’s suffrage movement 
in the United States, for instance, and she was paraded through streets of cities around 
the country.  In those parades, an individual woman was often carried on a float, but that 
woman did not represent herself so much as she represented women and a fuller state of 
liberty (Ryan, 1992).  Similarly, Ghandi and Mandela came to personify – but not 
individualise – the struggle for freedom and for new understandings of what it meant to 
be recognised as belonging to a community.  They became iconic figures for their virtue, 
but again, a virtue and ideals of justice and care that extended beyond their individual 
selves to the group, to broader political communities, and to the state.   
 Yet many theories of citizenship and debates about extending membership 
conceptualise individual citizens qua individuals, as the iconic figures of citizenship.  
Much as been made in liberal democratic theory of the citizen who is unencumbered and 
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rational (Habermas, 1990; Meeham, 1995; Anderson, 2006). Also in this framework, the 
rights and standing conferred by citizenship – including the right to participate in 
deliberation – are attached to individuals, rather than to groups.   So we are left in the 
contradictory situation in which individuals are extended rights of citizenship because of 
their membership in groups deemed worthy of membership.  Yet as individuals, they 
exercise those rights irrespective of their personal virtues and capabilities or whether they 
identify as a group member.  In the United States, a young person born in the country is 
not granted the right to vote because he or she is shown to be of good moral character 
or because he or she has demonstrated the ability and willingness to participate in 
rational deliberation.  A young person can claim the right to vote – and other rights of 
citizenship – when he or she turns 18-years-of-age, or in other words, because he or she 
has become a member of a group that is granted particular rights that will be exercised by 
individuals.  
 Why is this significant?  First, while citizenship rights might be extended to groups, 
they are often withdrawn from individuals.  In many places, for instance, failure to vote in 
successive elections leads to individuals being dropped from electoral roles; commission 
of serious crimes can also disqualify people from voting and from receiving other social 
rights, in addition to the withdrawal of freedom through incarceration.  It is rare that a 
class of individuals has rights withdrawn, and even rarer that their rights are withdrawn 
as a result of actions of an individual.  Second, immigrants have often been treated 
differently than other group members when citizenship is extended. Jesus, for instance, 
was not able to vote when he turned 18, because his membership in the group ‘alien’ was 
superior to his membership in the group ‘age of majority.’  And in situations where 
membership is made possible for immigrants through changes in rules that affect the 
group, individuals typically must show they qualify, often by passing some sort of 
naturalisation test or interview.  Naturalisation procedures, for example, have recently 
been developed in many European countries to allow people of the group ‘alien’ to 
demonstrate their integration into the group ‘citizen’ and thereby to claim the rights of 
citizenship in the country (Odmalm, 2007).  
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this suggests the importance of 
understanding citizenship as based on relationships between individuals, social groups, 
communities, and the state.  Many of the arguments just recounted rest on an idea of 
citizenship as a status signifying membership that is conferred by law.  Citizenship, 
however, is more than a status.  It is also a feeling and a practice that is conditioned by 
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law, but not reducible to it (Benhabib, 1999; Osler and Starkey, 2005; Leitner and 
Ehrkamp, 2006).  Again using immigrants as an example, laws clearly demark an 
individual’s alienage, thus limiting their ability to participate in public life or perhaps to 
earn a living, but law does not fully determine the way that an individual will live in a 
place.  Social norms and morés, interactions with other people, the demonstration of 
respect for difference, and a host of other social practices may make an immigrant (or 
any other individual, for that matter) feel more or less welcome and embraced by a 
community.  Those same norms, interactions, and practices may lead some members of a 
community to make other immigrants feel unwelcome.  In other words, how individuals 
are positioned relative to other people in the community and with respect to the 
community as a whole can create permeable boundaries of inclusion whereby some 
people will be seen as members under certain conditions or by certain people, and will be 
seen as outsiders under other conditions or by other people.  These feelings of belonging 
are affective, and as indicated previously, not reducible to legal status, or simply to 
‘objective’ social and personal characteristics.  This is why supporters of Jesus and his 
family could argue that family members were citizens, even though they lacked formal 
legal standing.  Their feelings and experiences – their subjectivities – were constructed in 
and through a series of relationships, including relationships that incorporated the family 
in the community of citizens.  
 The importance of affective relationships, often constructed through everyday 
encounters and relationships, are hard to overstate in the ways that citizenship is 
constructed.  Citizenship can be theorised and idealised as purely rational and as 
unencumbered, but as citizenship is practiced, performed, and lived, it is anything but 
unencumbered.  The vitriolic debates and fear-mongering about some types of people, 
the tendency to draw boundaries and harden the edges around polities, and the 
acceptance of practices that deny liberties to some people are difficult to explain from 
the perspective of the idealised (and probably stereotyped) rational, unencumbered 
citizen.  Similarly, it is difficult to understand why there is any support at all for extending 
the rights of citizenship to people who are not seen as members of a polity unless 
relationships of obligation, mutuality, and interdependence are reckoned with.   These 
relationships undergird both the subjectivities of citizens and also the places in which it is 
lived; they also connect citizens in one place to citizens in other places.  The lived, 
relational nature of citizenship and of citizen subjectivities suggests that citizenship is not 
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co-terminus with the nation-state (Bauböck, 1994; Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006; Staeheli 
and Nagel, 2006; Smith and Bakker, 2008; Ho, 2010).   
 
The Spatiality of Citizenship  
 
The spatiality of citizenship is important both in normative and practical terms.  
Normatively, one would want citizenship to be located in the sites where commitments 
to the polity and to other citizens and where self-development can best be encouraged 
(Delanty, 2000; Bauböck, 1994).  Practically, structures of governance mean that 
territorialized forms of citizenship are the most feasible way to regulate citizens for 
particular ends and to create institutional forms that citizens can access to make claims.  
But as we argued with regard to the spatiality of law and legal systems, what seems so 
clear on the surface is much more complex in practice.   
 Much of the literature seems to assume that the “natural” location of citizenship is 
in the nation-state, even though there is little basis for this linkage in most theories 
(Bosniak, 2006).  The reason for this linkage, of course, has to do with the roles that 
constitutions, law, and jurisprudence have played in the past 250 years in giving 
citizenship particular institutional and national forms.  But in recent decades, there have 
been several arguments – in academic texts and in public debates – about the changing 
territoriality of citizenship that has accompanied globalisation, migration, and the 
development of human rights regimes (Soysal, 1994; Jacobson, 1996; Brubaker, 2001).  
The effect of these trends, advocates often argue, is to challenge national citizenship in 
important ways (Appadurai, 1996).  Globalisation and the temporally coincident rise of 
what has been called “neo-liberal governance” is often linked to the reduced capacity and 
willingness of national governments to support the social rights of citizenship, such as 
welfare provision (Ward and Gleiditch, 2004; Leitner and Preston, 2010).  International 
migration is linked with new bi-national, transnational, and even cosmopolitan or post-
national conceptualisations of citizenship that reflect the ways in which migrants develop 
multiple attachments to countries and that challenge assumptions about the linkage 
between citizenship and a single, territorially-rooted nation-state (Bauböck, 1994; 
Hannerz, 1996; Joppke, 1999; Soysal, 2000; Smith and Bakker, 2008).  And finally, the 
supranational institutions associated with human rights and international governance 
provide an additional, higher jurisdiction in which citizens can press claims, and, it is 
argued, may lead to instrumental notions of citizenship in which rights are prioritised 
over identification, obligation, and responsibility (Brubaker, 2001).  Citizenship, from this 
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perspective, seems not to involve a deep sense of membership or to rely on bonds 
between citizens.   
 Despite – or perhaps because of – these challenges, many states have reinforced 
their borders, more tightly bounding their territories and controlling the population 
within them, effectively making the entire country a border zone (Nevins, 2002). Young 
(2003) argues that states play on the insecurities that accompany globalisation and 
economic and social change, using those fears to justify the creation of protectionist 
security states.  One manifestation of this can be seen in stepped up border enforcement 
that reinforces the territorial edges of citizenship.  But rather than limit border 
enforcement to the boundaries of the state, new technologies have created metaphorical 
– but nevertheless strictly enforced – border zones within countries.  Winders (2007), for 
instance, has documented the ways in which border enforcement has moved into the 
interior of the US and is enacted through a host of rules and institutions that are not 
obviously or historically imagined as sites of the border; these include state agencies that 
grant drivers’ licenses and institutions that are tasked with monitoring financial 
transactions.  In addition, local and state governments in the US have played more 
prominent roles in immigration control and policies since 9/11, thus effectively pushing 
the border inward (Coleman, 2007; Varsanyi, 2008). These legal technologies are 
enhanced by biometric technologies that locate borders and boundary enforcement in 
the bodies of individuals, no matter where those bodies may be located at particular 
moments and no matter what citizenship is attached to them (Amoore, 2006; Sparke, 
2006).  The significance of these monitoring technologies for the territoriality of 
citizenship is that individuals are subject to disciplining – and in the case of immigrants, 
to deportation – no matter where they may be.   For citizens and non-citizens alike, the 
fear of discipline can have indirect effects on the exercise of rights associated with 
citizenship, such as protest or challenging the state or a host of mundane acts associated 
with daily life.  In this sense, the security state that is justified by fear is enhanced by an 
internalised sense of fear that regulates the exercise of citizenship in an expanded border 
zone.   
 The spatiality of citizenship involves more than its location in a particular national 
territory, however.  Citizenship is also located in communities and acts of participation.  
Such discourse reflects two reinforcing conditions. It recognises the ways that 
relationships developed in place can enhance a feeling of mutuality, obligation and care 
on the part of individuals toward each other that, somewhat romantically, can be the 
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basis of community and polity; in Osler and Starkey’s (2005) terms, these relationships 
foster both a feeling of being a citizen and the practice of citizenship.  In seeming 
contradiction, however, fears of migrants’ multiple attachments and their 
transnational/translocal ties are used to justify communities’ suspicion toward migrant 
neighbours.  Citizens’ protests and political initiatives against mosques and minarets in 
numerous places are a case in point (Ehrkamp, forthcoming).  Those who view 
themselves as rightfully belonging to a place and nation-state (by birthright citizenship or 
long term residency) question the loyalties and commitments of those who maintain ties 
to an ‘elsewhere.’  Locally and nationally based communities, thus, often use the complex 
spatiality of migrants’ lives as grounds of exclusion.  This exacerbates the exclusionary 
potential of neo-liberal governance, which has come to depend on the ability to activate 
feelings and relationships in localised communities in order to provide targeted social 
services and to ensure the social rights of citizenship (Fyfe and Miligan, 2003; Trudeau, 
2008).  
These arguments and policies have important, but complex, spatial bases and a 
bewildering variety of implications (and interpretations). For instance, governments often 
argue that local provision of services allows greater flexibility to meet the specific needs 
of individuals, by activating principles of care and expressions of mutuality.  But there are 
competing claims that pushing responsibility for providing the social rights of citizenship 
onto localities diminishes the rights themselves, as the localities with the greatest needs 
will be least able to meet those needs (Amin, 2004).  Some people argue that fostering 
the affective sense of citizenship – rooted in mutuality, responsibility, membership, 
belonging, and care – is most easily accomplished at the local level through residence and 
engagement with the places of daily life (Kemmis, 1995; Barber, 1998).  But there are 
counter arguments that local provision of services may make it less likely that needed 
services will be extended to ‘newcomers’, particularly when the newcomers are culturally 
or socially different to those who are currently ‘members.’ There are further questions 
about whether deeper engagement with struggles in neighbourhoods and communities 
will foster a localism that eschews broader political struggles and entraps neo-liberal 
citizens in narrowly circumscribed communities.  Yet other people argue that local 
activism and citizenship can highlight the structural inequalities of capitalist development 
and represent efforts to promote more radical democratic possibilities that extend 
beyond localities (Purcell, 2007). That many of the debates just recounted are waged 
using competing examples from local case studies suggests a further element of 
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citizenship’s spatiality, and the uneven development of capacities to construct a form of 
citizenship with particular qualities or connectivities.  One can ask, for instance, why 
some localities and states are willing to advance legislation that extends social rights to 
undocumented immigrants (e.g., the DREAM acts that have been passed by different 
states and the extension of human rights protections to immigrants by many cities) or to 
build alliances between migrant and non-migrant workers (Sziarto and Leitner, 2010).  By 
the same token, one case ask why it is that other localities have passed or attempted to 
pass legislation that curtails the freedoms of migrants.  Even more perplexing, how is it 
that in the same state or metropolitan area, localities can enact both inclusionary and 
exclusionary laws and practices.  Pima County, Arizona, for instance, has twice elected a 
sheriff that refuses to follow US rules that extend certain liberties to migrants, even as it 
is home to an active Sanctuary movement supported by mainstream churches.  
 The varied processes that create such unevenness and seeming contradictions exist 
simultaneously, creating citizenships that are multi-local and polyvalent (Ehrkamp and 
Leitner, 2003).   This is because all aspects of citizenship are polyvalent. Rather than 
being constructed through an internally consistent and reinforcing set of legal 
frameworks, norms, practices, and subjectivities, citizenship is an amalgamation of each, 
converging in some respects and contradictory in others (Bosniak, 2006, p. 35). We need, 
therefore, to understand citizenship in all its complexity, rather than in terms of its 
various elements.  In so doing, we need to avoid the separation of legal standing from 
standing in communities, to eschew the distinction from formal and substantive aspects 
of citizenship, and instead, to look at the ways in which citizenship reflects and 
reinforces particular kinds of orders that structure both law and daily life.   
 
III Ordinariness and the Daily Life of Citizenship 
 
Think about citizenship from Jesus’ perspective.  His story is obviously one in which 
law and the more formal aspects of citizenship are important.  But Jesus’ life is not 
reducible to the law and the way it structures citizenship.  There are also the bonds of 
membership and belonging that were activated when he was denied the scholarship and 
when friends agitated to draw attention to his situation, leading to the media coverage of 
his case.  There were the opportunities he would be afforded with a college education, 
as well as the different opportunities he might forgo without it.  Yet the feelings of 
obligation and bonds of mutuality were at some moments to of secondary importance 
and conveyed less power than the rules surrounding his legal status.  There were also 
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arguments about his “true” citizenship that were independent of legal status; this 
citizenship was built locally through participation, moral behaviour, and demonstrable 
respect and care for others in his community and school.  And there are the territorial 
aspects of his citizenship, whereby his legal citizenship was in Mexico, a country in 
which he has lived less than half of his life. Citizenship was something that he had not 
thought of for most of his life, but that became central to him at a critical moment.  All 
of these aspects of citizenship and the debates surrounding each of them were woven 
together in his life such that they became inseparable.  
 One way to make sense of all this is to think of citizenship as ‘ordinary.’  There is a 
profusion of writing these days that seems to celebrate the banal (e.g., Billig, 1995; Katz, 
2007), the prosaic (e.g., Painter, 2006), the quotidian or everyday (e.g., Mountz, 2003) and 
the ordinary (e.g., Amin and Graham, 1997; Robinson, 2006). The purpose of this 
writing, of course, is to show how the boring, banal, prosaic or ordinary are anything but 
what is implied by the descriptor; it is to show just how important daily life and the 
“taken-for-granted” are to broader processes that shape our world.   
The taken-for-granted practices and relationships that guide our lives provide a kind 
of order, even as they may be difficult to pinpoint or articulate; they are part of what 
Waldron (2006, p. 83) describes as the “dense thicket of rules” that sustain our collective 
lives.   The rules he points to are only sometimes laws; they are sometimes social norms 
that may complement, or in some cases, be more powerful than law (p. 85).  There are 
two elements of these norms and their relationship with law that are particularly 
important for our argument. First, these norms guide interactions between strangers such 
that we can function; daily life in the world, Waldron notes, is not anarchy.  Second, he 
argues there is duplication between cosmopolitan norms and municipal laws that opens a 
space for democracy and citizenship beyond what national law might imagine or 
construct.  As such, the citizenship of daily life is not fully constrained by law, but 
instead fuses law with abstract norms and the behaviours, relationships and interactions 
of daily life.   These interactions and encounters can lead to conflict and exclusion, but 
they can also lead to feelings of conviviality, to understanding, to belonging, or to simply 
getting on with each other (Amin, 2002; Gilroy, 2004; Watson, 2006; Keith, 2008; 
Valentine, 2008; Clayton, 2009).   In other words, the ordinary, the quotidian, the 
everyday has a powerful role to play in the way citizenship is structured, practiced, and 
enacted.   
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In advocating an ordinary understanding, we do not winnow out the complexities 
and contradictions that are present in the debates over citizenship, for the very term 
“ordinary” incorporates those complexities.  Consider the definitions of ordinary that 
come from the dictionaries in our homes.  There is the definition in the Oxford Concise 
English Dictionary which defines the term in the following way:  
 
Or•di•nar•y 
Adjective 
1.  with no special or distinctive features; uninteresting; commonplace 
2. exercising authority by virtue of office, not by delegation 
 
Noun 
1.  what is commonplace or standard 
2.  inferior quality, second-rate, little merit 
 
Dictionary.net includes another definition of the noun:  “norms, normal and 
according to established order; methodical; settled; regular.”  And the Random 
House Dictionary of the English Language adds the definition of “customary”.  
Importantly, it traces ordinary to the Middle English word ordinarie, which in turn 
comes from the Latin words for “order” and “pertaining to”.   
 In these definitions, we can see the ways that ordinary takes on its full 
meaning for citizenship.  It is commonplace, standard, customary.  Many of us quite 
happily live our lives without thinking about our citizenship for extended periods of 
time.  But citizenship is also involved in establishing the order that we need so that 
we can go about our lives; arguments about the boundaries of citizenship and the 
responsibilities of citizens are fundamentally about order.  And citizenship is 
typically granted as a form of birthright, drawing either from where an individual is 
born or to whom the individual is born (Shachar, 2009).  As such, it carries its 
authority by virtue of standing, rather than because we necessarily did any thing to 
earn it.  In other words, citizenship is part of daily life, something we enact, even as 
it is part of a broader system by which order is maintained.  It is always present as 
an ordering framework, even if we do not give it special attention until it seems to 
be imperilled or denied as a standing.    
The addition of “ordinary” to “citizenship” highlights the importance of 
authority, standing, office, custom, what is commonplace and standard.  This 
expanded conceptualisation entwines legal status with the everyday and the 
unremarkable.  In so doing, the concept draws attention to the ways in which law 
and ordering are normalised through daily life.  At the same time, the concept 
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directs attention to the ways that citizenship struggles draw on a range of resources 
and claims beyond the law.  These are resources and claims rooted in family, in 
community, and in an expanded range of moral universes; some of these claims are 
powerful, while some may seem second-rate and to have little purchase before the 
law.  Jesus’ high standing in the community did not provide the basis for claims on 
the statutory rights of citizenship in the US.  Yet a private relief bill was introduced 
because of the affective bonds of citizenship that were evident in the case; these 
bonds were also important to the broader mobilisations around the claims he, and 
other immigrants, came to represent in the DREAM Act.   
In addition, the concept of ordinary allows us to consider values and 
rationalities beyond those associated with liberal democracy, that are mobilised in 
political debate and contestation, and that are enacted in the everyday.  For instance, 
we might suppose that citizens are motivated by rationalities in addition to the 
rationalism in abstract debates about justice.  Situating citizenship in daily life allows 
other rationalities and other values to enter politics as legitimate and normal, such as 
values of care, mutuality, love, respect, and other-regardingness.  These values are 
important motivations in many struggles, and they offer a kind of power.  They 
might, for instance, be part of a struggle for social justice and well-being, linking 
process and outcome in ways that are different than they might be in liberal theories 
of democracy and citizenship.  The linkages, however, often emerge from and are 
important to the lives of citizens and their efforts to build more democratic polities 
and societies.  Theoretical and political arguments over citizenship need to account 
for those lives and values.   
 There are also important spatialities to ordinariness. As we have argued, the 
relationship between citizenship and the nation-state is imperfect.  Citizenship is 
“located” or “mapped” at different sites.  The ways we live and understand 
citizenship are not fully defined by nation-states, even though its institutions are 
important, as Waldron (2006) notes.  Homes (whether where an individual currently 
lives or elsewhere), families, neighbourhoods, villages, cities, and nations are all 
important to the geography of citizenship.  So, too, are communities that are not 
easily mapped or that might be described as placeless, such as cyber-communities or 
activist networks.  We need, in other words, a more complete geography of 
citizenship that includes the geographies of daily life and of attachment.  This more 
complete geography needs to include the obvious and institutionalised spaces of 
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citizenship – such as public spaces, places of government – as well as citizenship’s 
hidden spaces – such as homes, workplaces, and houses of worship.  It needs to 
include feelings of belonging to localities – both ‘here’ and ‘there’ – and to 
communities and to the broader world.  It also, however, needs to include the 
connections and networks that link the different sites of citizenship.  The sites we 
have mentioned do not exist in isolation, and so the spatiality of citizenship includes 
the relations and mobilities through with the sites are connected and through which 
the everyday and the law are enacted.   
 
IV Conclusion 
The geography of ordinary citizenship, then, is really the geography of social 
relationships, including political and economic relationships.  Very often, citizenship 
is described as something that is unencumbered by social relationships and that is 
both a social and a geographic equaliser.  Citizenship is anything but that.  It is not 
everywhere the same. Citizenship varies across place, across time, and for different 
people.  It is inseparable from the geographies of communities and the networks 
and relationships that link them, with their attendant inequalities, imperfections, and 
opportunities.  Citizenship is constructed in part through the geographies of our 
lives, and so cannot equalise or transcend our differences.   
As a way of understanding citizenship, our insistence on its ordinariness – its 
commonness and its ordering function – builds a messiness and untidiness into 
theoretical arguments.  Yet this approach recognises and incorporates the 
contingencies that are an ineluctable element of citizenship.  To say that 
ordinariness imposes an order does not mean it is everywhere and always the same.   
That order is continually challenged and contested in large and small ways, through 
law, through custom, and through the practicalities of everyday life; these challenges 
are the source of the disorder, of change large and small, that we see over time and 
that are part of the spatiality of citizenship. Ordinary citizenship, thus, focuses our 
attention on the ways that a variety of agents, drawing on different forms of power, 
negotiate the frameworks that order lives, communities and societies. In this way, 
and as Jesus experienced it, citizenship is both ordinary and extraordinary. 
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Notes 
 
i In the US, each of the 50 states runs its own university system.  In most cases, lower 
fees are charged for students from the state than from students who come from out of 
the state.  Out-of-state tuition at the University of Colorado was about 600% of in-state 
tuition at that time. 
ii Although see Isin and Woods (1999), Kofman (2003) and Staeheli (2010) for reviews.   
iii It is for this reason that much of the discussion about law and legality is centred on the 
US system.  We attempt, however, to make broader points about law and legality, of 
which the US experience is simply an example.   
iv Lady Liberty is an allegorical figure, usually represented by a woman in classical robes 
carrying some combination of a torch, the scales of justice, or a tablet of laws.  
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Table 1: 
Framing Citizenship: 
Evaluating Jesus’ Situation 
 
 
 
      
   Normative Foundations                         
 
of Citizenship 
Domains of 
Citizenship 
 
Justice 
 
Care 
Boundaries -- States can set rules of 
entry to and exclusion from 
the territory and society.   
 -- The parents did not 
follow rules. 
-- It is appropriate to 
deport violators and/or to 
deny benefits. 
-- There was no effort to 
deport family previously, so 
boundary issues are 
subsumed to relationships 
built in new community 
-- Family should not be 
deported; decision about 
benefits not relevant to 
boundaries. 
 
Rights and 
responsbilities 
-- Jesus was not responsible 
for the actions of his 
parents.  
-- Parents have fulfilled 
other responsibilities of 
citizenship. 
-- Jesus should be allowed 
in-state tuition.  
-- Family are active and 
responsible members of 
community.   
-- The community has 
responsibilities to people 
who have lived there for 
years. 
-- Family should not be 
deported. 
--Jesus should be allowed 
in-state tuition. 
 
 
 
 
